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Globalization signifies the triumph of capitalism over all other economic 
systems.  Free market capitalists such as Jagdish Bhagwati believe that a world run 
by ‘market forces’ to be the bearer of development and prosperity for all.  Open 
economies allow countries to benefit from comparative advantage, direct foreign 
investment and aid,1 which facilitates the movement of the undeveloped world up 
the development ladder.  However, 770 million of the approximate one billion 
people in extreme poverty live in sub-Saharan Africa.2 Reasons for this are 
numerous and include: nature (disease, geography, and limited natural resources), 
colonial legacy, bad governance (specifically corruption and instability), 
tribal/ethnic/religious conflicts, and economics (IMF “structural adjustment” or 
fiscal austerity and lack of financial norms and investment in domestic capital).3
Among economists and political scientists there are two competing theories 
regarding continental sub-Saharan Africa’s inability to benefit from globalization.  
Jeffrey Sachs, Paul Collier and George Ayittey champion a “holistic” theory, 
which argues that the combination of the factors listed above trap sub-Saharan 
Africa in poverty, thereby preventing these countries from developing and 
benefiting from globalization.  Several other economists and Africanists, notably 
William Easterly, propose that “bad governance” is the root cause of poverty in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and bad governance can be fixed (so development is possible 
through globalization).4 An alternative explanation is that tribal/ethnic/religious 
                                                 
1 Cletus Coughlin, K. Alec Chrystal & Geoffrey Wood, “Protectionist Trade Policies: A Survey 
of Theory, Evidence, and Rationale,” International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global 
Power and Wealth (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press), 18-21.      
2 World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007. 
3 See Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be 
Done About It (New York, NY: Oxford UP), 17-64.  For further analysis see Jeffrey Sachs, The 
End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities of Our Time (New York, NY: The Penguin Press), 188-
209 & Paul Farmer, Infections and Inequalities: The Modern Plagues (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press), 262-282. 
4 William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have 
Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York, NY: The Penguin Press), 44-98.  For further 
analysis emphasizing post colonialism and indigenous institutions see George Ayittey, 
Indigenous African Institutions (New York, NY: Transnational Publishers), 415-474 & 478-501. 
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hatred within these countries has led to war, genocide and instability, and this 
factor eliminates any possible path to economic prosperity.  What is evident is that 
there are 39 countries in continental sub-Saharan Africa, and each country’s 
challenges are unique.  Therefore, it is unlikely that any generalized theory will 
fully represent the complete situation for each and every country.   This paper will 
attempt to resolve if present day continental sub-Saharan Africa is able to achieve 
development through the economic forces of globalization.  The scope is limited 
specifically to continental sub-Saharan Africa because economic dynamics of 
island countries are divergent from those of continental countries.  The 
methodology used is both qualitative and quantitative.  The qualitative analysis 
applies the competing and alternative theories to two specific case study countries 
(Botswana – middle income5 and Central African Republic – low income)6 and the 
eleven middle income countries.  The quantitative metric used to determine if a 
specific country is benefiting from globalization is if it has achieved the World 
Bank’s 2006 middle income status.7 The specific measurement is the 
macroeconomic indicator of GNI per capita, Atlas method (US dollars).  This 
methodology proves that the most important determinates regarding economic 
development through globalization are a country’s ability to transition to a stable 
form of government shortly after independence and its capacity to export its 
natural resources.   
This paper is divided into four parts.  Part one briefly presents the benefits of 
globalization.  Part two outlines the theories for why it is or is not working in 
continental sub-Saharan Africa, specifically elaborating on the “bad governance” 
explanation posited by Easterly and the “poverty trap” argument posed by Sachs et 
al; this section applies these theories to Central African Republic and Botswana.  
Central African Republic, a former Francophone colony, is an example of the 
average land-locked failing African state, which is characterized by chronic 
political and economic corruption, natural resource deficiencies, rampant diseases, 
and it does not appear to be benefiting from globalization (pro “poverty trap” 
example).  Botswana, a former Anglophone colony, is an example of a land-locked 
sub-Saharan African country that established good governance immediately after 
independence, reinvested and diversified domestically after the discovery of 
diamonds, and it is benefiting from globalization (most cited pro “bad governance” 
example).  Part three quantitatively and qualitatively applies the methodology to 
both the case studies and the middle income sub-Saharan African Countries.  Part 
four is an analysis and conclusion of the arguments and case studies, proposed 
                                                 
5 World Bank.  GNI per Capita, Atlas method and PPP, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007. 
6 Ibid. 
7 World Bank.  List of Economies, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007. 
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development solutions for continental sub-Saharan Africa and suggestions for 
further study.   
 
Global Capitalism Is the Answer 
 
Essentially the argument is that market forces (specifically supply and demand 
and comparative advantage), private direct foreign investment and government 
foreign aid (i.e. the tools of global capitalization) will lead to economic 
development.  Most economists agree that countries did not move beyond 
subsistence until the Industrial Revolution.  In the last 200 years market forces 
have led to a historically unprecedented level of human technological 
development.  However, most of the development has been achieved exclusively 
by the countries that took part in the Industrial Revolution.  Hence, these countries 
are coined “developed countries”.8  It follows that comparative advantage coupled 
with an open world market would also allow less developed countries to find a 
niche in the global marketplace.9 For example, as technology has advanced in the 
developed world so too has workers’ skill levels.  A rise in skill level leads to a rise 
in wages.  In the developing world, worker wages are lower as are costs to produce 
less technologically advanced goods.  If a developing country moves beyond the 
point of subsistence and exports, then their products would arguably be cheaper 
than identical products produced in the developed world.  Competition in a 
developing market will lead to technological innovation just as it did in the 
developed world in order to satisfy domestic consumer demands and international 
demands for cheaper goods.  An increase in a country’s domestic profits will 
facilitate increased investment in human capital (making its citizens more 
skilled).10 In this way developing countries will move up the development ladder.  
Furthermore, since finances have become more liberalized transnational banks lend 
more money to businesses in developing countries.  In other words, the developing 
world will not be hindered by the limits of their own financial institutions.11
The pro-globalization argument extends to actions in the political sphere.  For 
example, to invest in a developing country, one wants to know that the country will 
not collapse.  If it were to collapse, then most likely businesses and sources of 
profit would collapse too.  In fact what is most important to direct foreign 
                                                 
8 See Sachs, 26-50. For relation to the period of modern globalization see Thomas Friedman, The 
World is Flat (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux), 261-270. 
9 Coughlin et al., 18-21. 
10 Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (New York, NY: Oxford UP), 213-216. 
11 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & 
Company), 59-78. 
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investment is transparency, lack of inflation and responsible fiscal policy.12 A 
stable country will likely meet these requirements, but a country on the brink of 
civil war surely will not.  Along these lines, it is in the economic interests of 
developed countries to both help protect the investments of their citizens and open 
new markets.  One means for developed countries to do this is to provide aid to 
developing countries.  Aid to these countries would stimulate development and 
hopefully provide stability so that private investment would pour in.13 In sum, the 
economic forces of globalization (i.e. market forces, private direct foreign 
investment and government foreign aid) will lead to development in emerging 
countries.  
 
 
Globalization in Continental Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Scholars arguing that globalization is or is not leading to economic 
development in continental sub-Saharan Africa specifically point to the importance 
of non-economic factors.14 The following explanations illustrate the competing 
answers to this dilemma. 
Bad Governance 
Diagram 1 – Bad Governance 
 
Bad governance       Failing State 
 
and ipso facto 
 
Good governance           Developing State
 
 “Bad governance” proponents argue that bad governments create instability, 
which is unattractive to foreign investment, steal instead of re-invest in their 
countries, which negates both the potential of foreign aid and discoveries of single-
source natural resources, and do little to build infrastructure and educate their 
people.  The “bad governance” theory does not specifically account for either 
colonial legacy or domestic factors endemic to sub-Saharan African countries (i.e. 
geopolitical/geo-economical considerations and disease).  The “good governance” 
                                                 
12 Laura Mosley, “Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States,” 
International Organization (Cambridge, MA: MIT UP), 766-767. 
13 Alberto Alesina & David Dollar. “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?,” Journal of 
Economic Growth (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers), 33-35. 
14 See Collier 17-64. For further details see Sachs, 56-64. 
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corollary states if a country develops a “good government”, then the forces of 
globalization will lead to economic development.  However, the “good 
governance” corollary does not account for “timing”. Over three-forth’s of the sub-
Saharan African countries have endured at least one civil war or military coup15 
(i.e. over 75% of sub-Saharan African currently have or have had bad governance), 
and considering the volatile nature of military coups, it is highly probable that 
good governments have a limited time window to produce development before 
they are ousted by another government. 
Botswana is an example which appears to support the “good governance” 
corollary.  At the time of independence, Botswana chose a parliamentary 
democracy based on a multi-party system.16 Additionally, Botswana retained its 
major indigenous political process of “kgotlas” (chiefs and councilors meet “under 
a tree” to reach a consensus on important decisions).17 As a result, it has enjoyed 
political stability, and democracy has fostered freedom of expression and the 
peaceful coexistence of a multi-ethnic society.18 This is in spite of the fact that at 
independence 75 percent of the country was desert, and most of its citizens were 
illiterate.19  Its neighbors, South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia, were less than 
supportive of a “black” independent country in the white controlled region of 
South Africa.  Despite these factors Botswana’s GDP growth rate from 1966-
present has averaged between 6.5 – 8%, which is one of the highest growth rates in 
the world.20  In 1967 De Beers discovered diamonds in Botswana, and the first 
mine was opened in 1971.21  Unlike several other African countries (ex: Nigeria 
and Democratic Republic of the Congo), the discovery of a single-source natural 
resource did not lead to government corruption in Botswana.  Instead the 
government used export earnings to both develop its cattle and meat processing 
market and industrialize (58% of the population lives in urban centers vice 36% in 
the rest of sub-Saharan Africa).22  While Botswana appears to support the “bad 
governance” theory this may not entirely be the case.  Would Botswana have 
prospered if it had “bad governance” when it discovered diamonds?  It is entirely 
possible that a corrupt leader would have pocketed the riches from the diamond 
yields and not invested in the country.  Botswana is the most commonly cited 
                                                 
15 Collier, 17-37. 
16 Ayittey, 481. 
17 Ayittey, 483. 
18 See Ayittey, 478-483.  For further amplification see Easterly, 28. 
19 Ibid. 
20 See World Bank, Botswana at a Glance, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007. For 1966-
1986 see Ayittey, 480. 
21 Ayittey, 481. 
22 World Bank, Botswana at a Glance, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007. 
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continental sub-Saharan African success story by the “bad governance” theorists, 
but timing and early good governance definitely were crucial factors is its 
development.  Therefore, it may not necessarily be the case that the good 
governance corollary applies to a country with a long history of bad governance. 
 
The “Poverty Trap” 
Diagram 2—Poverty Trap 
 
                                                  Colonial legacy / geographic limitations   Poverty 
    Early chronic bad governance (conflict & embezzlement of aid/loans/resources) Trap  
Diseases 
 
 
“Poverty trap” scholars argue that the cumulative effects of colonial legacy, 
geographic limitations, early and chronic bad governance, and crippling diseases 
left continental sub-Saharan African countries in a predisposed condition which 
will not allow them to benefit from the forces of economic globalization.  Early 
and chronic bad governance has resulted in conflict and corruption, which has 
negated the positive forces of development aid, loans and the trade of lucrative 
natural resources such as oil and diamonds.23  European “colonial legacy” and the 
resultant geographic limitations it imposed on newly independent African countries 
prevented these countries from developing through globalization.  Lastly, diseases, 
such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, and waterborne pathogens have decimated the African 
population and work force.24
 
Early and Chronic Bad Governance 
 
The “bad governance” aspect of the poverty trap argument is similar to that 
posed by Easterly. It varies in that good governance generally cannot overcome the 
cumulative effects of decades of bad governance.  Central African Republic 
represents the prototypical example of this phenomenon.  This country’s first 
leader, David Dacko proved to be weak and corrupt, and he was removed through 
a coup on January 1, 1966.25 This coup propelled Colonel Bokassa to power; in 
turn he rescinded the constitution, dissolved the national assembly, and placed all 
legislative and executive powers in the hands of the President.26 He then declared 
                                                 
23 Collier, 17-37. 
24 Sachs. 189-205. 
25 Samuel Decalo, Psychoses of Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 140-144. 
26 See United States Department of State, Profile of the Central African Republic, Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2007, 1-4.  For an in depth post-colonial history see Central 
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook – Central African Republic, Washington, D.C.: 
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himself Emperor Bokassa I — Bokassa represented the archetypical African 
dictator.27 In 1979 Docko led a successful military coup and unseated Bokassa, but 
he was overthrown in 1981.28  In 1986 it appeared that CAR was on a path towards 
democracy.  Its new leader, President Kolingba, spearheaded the drafting of a new 
constitution emphasizing the creation of a multi-party system; however, his 
inability to improve the dire economic situation in the country led to his ouster in 
1993.29 His successor, Preseident Patasse was also unable to change the country’s 
abysmal economic situation, and in 2003 general Bozzie led a successful coup to 
seize power.30 General Bozzie declared himself president, suspended the 
constitution and dissolved the national assembly.31 If history holds true to form, 
then he has a limited time window to produce economic results before he is 
overthrown.  In CAR periods of potential good governance have not overcome the 
cumulative effects of chronic bad governance.    
 
Colonial Legacy  
 
The specific factor to determine is if European colonization contributed to a 
lack of economic development in sub-Saharan Africa.  Germany, Belgium, Spain, 
France, Britain, Italy and Portugal colonized portions of Africa.  Britain and France 
were the primary colonial forces; their reach extended to 38 of the 48 modern 
continental countries, and thus their influences require close analysis.  The British 
treated their African colonies as separately entities, whereas the French considered 
their colonies collective “providences”.32 The British adopted a political strategy of 
“indirect rule” in which they allowed indigenous chiefs and kings to govern.33 The 
French adopted a policy of “association”, which was a strategy to neutralize 
indigenous rulers and inculcate French values.34   If “indirect rule” provided a 
more stable situation for newly independent countries than French “association” 
did, then colonial legacy impacted early governance in African countries. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Central Intelligence Agency, 2007, 1-11.  For discussion of French colonial Africa see Ayittey, 
392-394. 
27 Decalo, 145-172. 
28 United States Department of State, Profile of the Central African Republic, Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of State, 2007, 1-4. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ayittey, 390-391. 
33 Ayittey, 390-396. 
34 Ibid. 
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The Anglophone/Francophone colonial legacy link to early good governance is 
not distinguishable in all sub-Saharan African colonies, but it is evident in the two 
case study countries.  The Central African Republic, or the former francophone 
colony of Oubangui-Chari, was part of French Equatorial Africa (AEF), which 
included present day Chad, Congo and Gabon.35  The most lucrative Francophone 
holdings were in French West Africa (AOF), which was where France sent most of 
its experienced government officials.36  Due to manpower limitations AEF 
colonies were governed by the dregs of the French African governing 
bureaucracy.37 To make matters worse, the French adopted a concessionary system 
modeled after Leopold’s Belgian Free Congo, which required its colonies to 
become self-sufficient.38 The combination of these decisions devastated AEF 
colonies as both companies and government officials brutalized the indigenous 
peoples, forced them to produce rubber, the primary cash yielding product of that 
region, and overly taxed and/or killed them if they did not produce enough of it.39 
Also, the French conception of decolonization was not geared toward 
independence.  Instead its goal was ideally to assimilate its African colonies into 
an empire, or its worst-case scenario was that these colonies would become 
dependant “client-states”.40 As colonial independence became inevitable, the 
French decided that, “domination of the overseas possessions was made easier by 
splitting them up into many weak and financially dependant countries.”41 Even in 
spite of the desires of the French appointed African leaders of the four AEF 
colonies to form one federal central African country, France granted independence 
individually to all of its AEF and AOF colonies.42  As a result, when Central 
African Republic gained its independence in 1966, its landlocked and resource 
scarce boundaries left it in a virtually helpless economic position. 
Botswana, on the other hand, was a British colony situation north of South 
Africa.  It benefited from “indirect rule” until is gained its independence in 1966.  
The British allowed indigenous tribal leaders to directly govern the colony with 
very minimal supervision, and at independence its “African” government was 
                                                 
35 Anton Andereggen, France’s Relationship with Subsaharan Africa (Westport, CT: Greewood 
Publishing Group, Inc.), 16-17. 
36 Anderggen, 1-9. 
37 Decalo, 133-134. 
38 See Anderggen, 1-9.  For further analysis see Patrick Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan 
Africa 1880-1995  (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP), 19-22. 
39 Decalo, 133-137. 
40 See Anderggen, 33-40. 
41 See Anderggen, 45. 
42 See Anderggen, 57-67. 
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essentially in place.  Arguably, Britain did not design its African colonies to be 
dependant “client-states”, and therefore Anglophone colonies were better postured 
to succeed after their independence than Francophone colonies were.  
 
Geography (indirect colonial legacy argument) 
 
Figures 1 and 2 visually present African geopolitics and geo-economics 
within a colonial legacy context. 
 
Figure 1 – 1914 Colonial Africa 
 
 
 
Source: http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/afri1914.htm 
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Figure 2 – Present Day Africa 
 
 
 
Source: www.nationsonline.org/maps/africa_small_map.jpg 
 
Figure 1 outlines the European colonies, which all have access to sea ports and 
are large enough to encompass diverse resources.  Figure 2 displays the states as 
they exist today; of note, fifteen sub-Saharan African states are landlocked.  More 
so than any other reason, being “landlocked with poor neighbors” is exclusively an 
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African problem.  To interact in the global economy, a country must be able to 
export.  To grow economically, land-locked countries either need to trade with 
neighbors or have access to regional infrastructure to transport goods to ports in 
order to trade globally. 
The Central African Republic is a landlocked country bordered by Cameroon, 
Chad, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Republic of the 
Congo (Congo).  Of its neighbors, only Cameroon is a coastal country.  Cameroon 
and Congo have recently emerged as middle income countries but Chad, DRC and 
Sudan are three of the lowest income countries in the world.43 Moreover, 
Cameroon, Chad, and DRC are rated by the UN as low human development 
countries  (measure considers human rights, political and economic freedom and 
laws).44  The Oubangui River flows along CAR’s southern border, and it is a 
tributary of the Congo River, which flows into the Atlantic Ocean through DRC 
and Congo.  Use of the Oubangui River for trade has been restricted due to 30 
years of political and civil instability in the DRC.45  The Central African Republic 
is a poor landlocked country surrounded by poor neighbors.  Regional trade is 
limited, and poor regional infrastructure restricts global trade—it is geographically 
trapped. 
Botswana appears to be an exception to the geography trap rule, but two of its 
neighbors, South Africa and Namibia, have been middle income states countries 
since Botswana’s independence.46 In addition, Namibia, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe (its other neighbor) rank as medium human development countries on 
the UN human development index.47  Botswana has been able to export its goods 
globally through developed South African infrastructure (approximately 83% of its 
exports travel through South Africa).48 Geography, while posing difficulties, has 
not prevented Botswana from developing, but it has not been surrounded by poor 
countries, so it does not disprove the geography aspect of “poverty trap” theory. 
 
Disease 
 
Paul Farmer argues that diseases have a much greater effect on the poor than 
the affluent.49 People in the developed world have access to drugs which can 
                                                 
43 World Bank. GNI per Capita, Atlas method and PPP, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007. 
44 United Nations, Human Development Report 2005, 363-365. 
45 Manning, 20-21. 
46 World Bank. South Africa Data Profile. Updated April 2007. & World Bank.  Namibia Data 
Profile. Updated April 2007. 
47 United Nations, Human Development Report 2005, 363. 
48 Ayittey, 478-483. 
49 Farmer, 282. 
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negate the effects of most of the world’s diseases.  This is generally not the case 
for people in the developing world.  Africa is home to the world’s most deadly 
form of malaria, percentage estimates of HIV/AIDS exceed 20% of the adult 
population in several countries, and contaminated water sources lead to a 
significant amount of parasite-borne illnesses.50 In Africa, diseases have three 
effects.  First, they incapacitate the workforce.  With insufficient workers, it is 
difficult to produce goods and take advantage of growth opportunities.  Second, 
diseases kill parents.  The AIDS pandemic has produced a generation of “AIDS” 
orphans.  Third, chronic diseases directly prevent children from attending school.  
Building a skilled workforce requires education.  If children are too sick to attend 
school, then achieving long-term economic development is problematic.  Diseases 
do not plague developed nations, but they cripple poor nations.     
How has Botswana handled the disease trap?  The World Health Organization 
estimates that up to 32% of the adult population of Botswana is HIV positive.51 
This is the second highest HIV/AIDS rate in the world.  However, at its 
independence in 1966, it was in the high risk malaria region of Africa, but by 1994 
it had become a low risk malaria country.52 Additionally, 95% of the population 
has access to an improved water source and child malnutrition is 13% (much better 
than the sub-Saharan African average of 56% and 30% respectively).53  While it 
has not avoided the HIV/AIDS pandemic, it has controlled diseases caused by 
malaria and water-borne parasites.  Expect that Botswana will continue to use the 
fruits of its economic development to treat and prevent HIV/AIDS as it did with 
Malaria. 
In contrast, Central African Republic has not overcome the disease trap.  The 
US State Department classifies the risk and prevalence of malaria and waterborne 
diseases in Central African Republic as “very high”.54 Situated equatorially and 
blanketed by a tropical climate, CAR is home to some of the deadliest strains of 
malaria in Africa.55 Furthermore, limited access to improved water sources results 
in a populace weakened by waterborne diseases.56 To make matters worse, 
HIV/AIDS is migrating north from southern Africa, and estimates for infected 
                                                 
50 Sachs, 199-204. 
51 World Health Organization, Botswana HIV/AIDS Estimates 2005, Geneva, Switzerland: World 
Health Organization, 2007. 
52 Sachs, Map 10. 
53 World Bank, Botswana at a Glance, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007. 
54 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook – Central African Republic, 4. 
55 Sachs, 189-205. 
56 World Bank. Central African Republic at a Glance. Updated 28 September 2007.  
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adults in CAR range from 10.7-17.2% of the population.57 Consequentially, Life 
expectancy is 39 years and infant mortality is 115 per 1000 live births (as 
compared to 96 for all of sub-Saharan Africa).58 By and large, CAR has not been 
able to overcome the disease trap. 
In review, the poverty trap advocates conclude that the cumulative effects of 
colonial legacy and geographic limitations, early and chronic bad governance, and 
crippling diseases prevent continental sub-Saharan African countries from 
benefiting through globalization.  Might it be the case that tribal/ethnic/religious 
hatred within African countries has led to war, genocide and instability, and this 
factor is really what eliminates paths to economic prosperity?  In the last 20 years 
conflicts and genocide in Sudan, Rwanda, Uganda, DRC and Chad have garnered 
world media attention, but the reality of the matter is these events, while tragic, are 
isolated incidents.  Economic development in these countries and spillover into 
neighboring countries most certainly was impacted, but these specific cases do not 
apply to the vast majority of African countries which have not endured genocide.  
Therefore, this alternative explanation is specific rather than generally applicable 
to continental sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
An alternative method for measuring the two theories 
 
The following tables highlight specific data necessary to analyze the validity of 
these theories.  The categories listed are 2006 GNI per capita (Atlas method), 
geography (land locked/coastal), government (history of stability or instability and 
corruption), colonial legacy (primary colonizer), date of independence and primary 
export.  GNI per capita (Atlas method) and not GNP/GDP per cent growth is used 
to measure positive or negative globalization for three reasons.  First, 2006 World 
Bank middle income status reflected by GNI per capita indicates a sustained level 
of economic growth over time, whereas GNP/GDP % growth is easily skewed by 
the time interval examined.  Second, GNI per capita accounts for country 
population, whereas GNP/GDP per cent growth does not.  Last, 2006 GNI per 
capita is the most current and accurate statistical measurement available.  In terms 
of GNI per capita, 28 of the 39 continental sub-Saharan African countries fall into 
the low income aggregate ($905 or less),59 and the remaining eleven countries are 
in the middle income aggregate ($906-11,115).60 Table one displays Botswana and 
                                                 
57 World Health Organization, Central African Republic HIV/AIDS Estimates 2005. Geneva, 
Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2007. 
58 World Bank, Central African Republic at a Glance, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007. 
59 World Bank.  GNI per Capita, Atlas method and PPP, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007. 
60 Ibid. 
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its neighbors, Table two displays Central African Republic its neighbors and Table 
three displays the eleven countries in the middle income aggregate.   
 
Table 1 – Botswana & Its Neighbors 61
 
Country GNI 
per 
capita 
Geography Gov’t Colonial 
Legacy 
Independ
ence 
Primary 
Export 
Botswana 5,900 
(middle) 
landlocked stable British 1966 diamonds 
& value 
added 
services  
South 
Africa 
5,390 
(middle) 
coastal stable British 1910 value 
added 
services 
Namibia 3,230 
(middle) 
coastal stable German 
/ S. 
African 
1990 
(from S. 
Africa) 
diamonds 
& uranium 
Zimbabwe 340 
(low) 
landlocked stable & 
corrupt  
British 1980 value 
added 
agricultural 
services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 See World Bank.  GNI per Capita, Atlas method and PPP, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
2007.  For geography, government, colonial legacy, independence and primary export see 
Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook – Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe & World Bank. , Botswana South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe Data Profiles. 
Updated April 2007. 
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Table 2 – Central African Republic & Its Neighbors 62
 
Country GNI 
per 
capita 
Geography Government Colonial 
Legacy 
Independence Primary 
Export 
Central 
African 
Republic 
360 
(low) 
landlocked instable & 
corrupt 
French 1960 agriculture
Cameroon 1,080 
(middle) 
coastal stable British 
& 
French 
1960 oil 
Congo, 
Rep 
950 
(middle) 
coastal instable French 1960 oil & 
value 
added 
support 
services 
Sudan 810 
(low) 
landlocked instable & 
corrupt  
British 1956 oil & 
agriculture
Chad 480 
(low) 
landlocked instable & 
corrupt 
French 1960 oil 
Democratic 
Republic 
of the 
Congo 
130 
(low) 
coastal (37 
km only) 
instable & 
corrupt 
Belgian 1960 agriculture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 See World Bank.  GNI per Capita, Atlas method and PPP, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
2007.  For geography, government, colonial legacy, independence and primary export see 
Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook –Central African Republic, Republic of the 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Cameroon, Sudan . & World Bank. , Central 
African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Cameroon, 
Sudan Data Profiles. Updated April 2007. 
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Table 3 – Middle Income Aggregate Countries 63
 
Country GNI 
per 
capita 
Geography Government Colonial 
Legacy 
Independence Primary 
Export 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
8,250 coastal stable Spanish 1968 oil 
Botswana 5,900 landlocked stable British 1966 diamonds & 
value added 
services  
South 
Africa 
5,390 coastal stable British 1910 value added 
services 
Gabon 5,000 coastal stable French 1960 oil 
Namibia 3,230 coastal stable German / 
S. African 
1990 (from S. 
Africa) 
diamonds & 
uranium  
Swaziland 2,430 landlocked stable British 1968 manufacturing
Angola 1,980 coastal instable Portuguese 1975 oil 
Cameroon 1,080 coastal stable British & 
French 
1960 oil 
Djibouti 1,060 coastal stable Arab / 
French 
1977 trade services 
Lesotho 1,030 landlocked stable British 1966 value added 
industry & 
services  
Congo, 
Rep 
950 coastal instable French 1960 Oil & value 
added support 
services 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 See World Bank.  GNI per Capita, Atlas method and PPP, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
2007.  For geography, government, colonial legacy, independence and primary export see 
Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook – Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, 
Swaziland, Lesotho, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, 
Cameroon  & World Bank. , Botswana South Africa, Namibia Swaziland, Lesotho, Republic of 
the Congo, Gabon, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Cameroon, Data Profiles. Updated 
April 2007. 
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Analysis 
 
Tables one and two yield little new evidence that the case studies did not, but 
analysis of the eleven middle income countries introduces new possibilities.  First, 
Botswana is not the only landlocked country to reach middle income status.  
However, Lesotho and Swaziland are enveloped by South Africa.  Both of these 
emerging countries have limited natural resources and rudimentary economic 
diversification, but they benefit immensely from favorable trade relationships with 
South Africa and subsequent worker remittances.64  Second, add Namibia and 
Botswana to Swaziland and Lesotho and it appears that “being neighbors with 
South Africa”, the continent’s most diversified economy, is a legitimate path to 
benefiting from globalization.  Third, Angola and Congo are intriguing examples.  
Both countries have endured instable governing regimes, civil wars and repressive 
colonial influences,65 and yet both have recently achieved middle income status.  
Their elevation in status might also be attributed to soaring oil prices and an 
unscrupulous Chinese oil investment strategy in Africa, but if they continue on 
their current upward trend neither the bad governance nor the poverty trap theories 
account for their successes.  Forth, Djibouti appears to be an anomaly.  Excepting 
Lesotho and Swaziland it is the only other middle income country to achieve its 
status without the benefit of plush oil reserves or diamond mines.  Djibouti has the 
distinction of strategic location—it is located on the horn of Africa, and it is a 
major trading port for goods and oil entering and leaving the Red Sea.  
Additionally, since “9/11” it has actively supported the US led Global War on 
Terrorism; US military units are stationed and train within its borders.  Lastly, the 
most significant and replicated development indicators among the middle income 
countries are stable government and lucrative natural resources (oil and diamonds).   
   
Conclusion 
 
  This paper has attempted to resolve whether globalization will bring 
development to continental sub-Saharan Africa.  This region poses a difficult 
challenge for global capitalism.  The combination of incipient and chronic bad 
governance since independence, near universal poverty and lack of development, 
geographical limitations imposed on countries by extant borders and colonial 
legacies, and pandemic diseases render most countries both too corrupt to fix their 
problems with aid and too unstable to attract substantial direct foreign investment. 
                                                 
64 The World Factbook – Swaziland and Lesotho. 
65 The World Factbook – Angola and Republic of the Congo. 
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It may indeed be the case that bad governance is the root cause of the problem, 
but the cumulative effects of 40-50 years of corruption, civil war and coups have 
potentially “trapped” over 70% of continental sub-Saharan African countries in the 
World Bank low income aggregate.66 Governance changes will lay the foundation, 
but new governments have a limited time table to affect positive economic change 
before being displaced.  A globalist’s prediction would be that politically stable 
port countries which receive development aid and foreign investment will climb 
the ladder of development.  This in turn will provide stable landlocked countries 
“good” neighbors with whom to trade (actualizing a means for landlocked 
countries to climb the development ladder too). Several developed countries, 
including the United States, seem to have drawn this conclusion.  The US 
established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC),67 which measures a 
country’s level of good governance and provides aid based on qualifying 
conditions.  The success rate of MCC countries over time is probably the best 
assessment of the good governance corollary. 
Solutions to “fix” sub-Saharan Africa range from top-down “big push/shock 
therapy” aid strategies designed to jump start failing economies,68 to policies 
combining aid, preferential agricultural trade agreements between Africa and the 
West and international military intervention to create African stability,69 and 
“bottom up” approaches focused on asset accumulation and African produced 
solutions to problems.70 As Easterly states, “The dynamism of the poor at the 
bottom has much more potential than the plans at the top.”71 Presently it is 
uncertain whether globalization will develop Africa.  If the plight of the Central 
African Republic is an example of what not to do, and Botswana is an example of 
what to do, then success will be achieved when African countries both combine 
indigenous institutions, customs and traditions with stable governance and harness 
the powerful forces of globalization to forge their own unique paths towards 
development.  
                                                 
66 World Bank.  GNI per Capita, Atlas method and PPP, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007. 
67 Collier, 110. 
68 Sachs, 211-302. 
69 Collier, 99-192. 
70 See Caroline Moser, Reducing Global Poverty: The Case for Asset Accumulation 
(Washington D.C., Brookings Institute Press), 83-100 & 137-147.  For further analysis see: 
Christopher Barrett, Michael Carter, & Peter Little, “Understanding and Reducing Persistent 
Poverty in Africa: Introduction to a Special Issue”.  Journal of Development Studies.  Vol. 42, 
No. 2 (Feb. 2006): 167-177. Michael Carter & Christopher Barrett, “The Economics of Poverty 
Traps and Persistent Poverty: An Asset-Based Approach”. Journal of Development Studies.  Vol. 
42, No. 2 (Feb. 2006): 178-199. Easterly, 368-382. 
71 Easterly, 108. 
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